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jackIn a recent discussion about free will, I asked the rhetorical question, "What would a universe WITHOUT free will be like? How would it be different?" I expected that to be unanswerable, but Liv inadvertently did give an answer.
She reminded me of the Benjamin_Libet experiments, which seemed to show some actions which we supposed to be of conscious volition were actually instigated unconsciously prior to any conscious recognition of the decision. Now, there are any number of quibbles with whether the experiments actually show anything relevant or not, but that's not actually very relevant to the point, because it seems exceptionally plausible that some decisions are made instinctively and have a rational justification tacked on only once it's under way.
However, it also seems likely that that's not always the case. There are pages of discussion on places like lesswrong.com about when it's best to decide instinctively, and when it's best to make explicit the reasoning process in order that every aspect of the decision is palatable to the conscious mind (even if some of them are subjective).
Liv also made the point that if my subconscious is part of me, I can't complain it's not me making the decision, although I argued that I might still object it wasn't free will if I was deciding for instinctual reasons and not the reasons I thought I was deciding for.
Having imagined a scenario where we don't have free will (in at least some ways), actually made me much more optimistic, and much more willing to use "free will" to describe the situation we're actually in (whereas previously I would have doubted "free will" having any meaning AT ALL, as I couldn't imagine any meaning of "me" other than "what makes my decisions" making the concept rather redundant).
On the other hand, having imagined a scenario where we don't</> have free will (in at least some ways), I am even less inclined to argue that the inability to delegate the decision to a mythical, spiritual, intangible, unfalsifiable "actual" us, rather than the actual physical us, is a drawback to free will.
She reminded me of the Benjamin_Libet experiments, which seemed to show some actions which we supposed to be of conscious volition were actually instigated unconsciously prior to any conscious recognition of the decision. Now, there are any number of quibbles with whether the experiments actually show anything relevant or not, but that's not actually very relevant to the point, because it seems exceptionally plausible that some decisions are made instinctively and have a rational justification tacked on only once it's under way.
However, it also seems likely that that's not always the case. There are pages of discussion on places like lesswrong.com about when it's best to decide instinctively, and when it's best to make explicit the reasoning process in order that every aspect of the decision is palatable to the conscious mind (even if some of them are subjective).
Liv also made the point that if my subconscious is part of me, I can't complain it's not me making the decision, although I argued that I might still object it wasn't free will if I was deciding for instinctual reasons and not the reasons I thought I was deciding for.
Having imagined a scenario where we don't have free will (in at least some ways), actually made me much more optimistic, and much more willing to use "free will" to describe the situation we're actually in (whereas previously I would have doubted "free will" having any meaning AT ALL, as I couldn't imagine any meaning of "me" other than "what makes my decisions" making the concept rather redundant).
On the other hand, having imagined a scenario where we don't</> have free will (in at least some ways), I am even less inclined to argue that the inability to delegate the decision to a mythical, spiritual, intangible, unfalsifiable "actual" us, rather than the actual physical us, is a drawback to free will.