Question of Evil

[jack]

If you were the God, and all possible parallel universes existed side-by-side, what would you do? Would you delete most, or transform them into copies of the one where people were happiest? Or let them run?

To me, that thought experiment relates to several questions:

* The problem of evil "If God existed, and were omnipotent and good, why would he let there be bad things". If you can even conceive of God not reordering all his universes to be "best", that is one possible answer to the question. (Not that I think that's true, but it's possibly a rebuttal to the argument that "There are bad things, therefore God is at most two of good, omnipotent, and existing")

* A logical extension of local morality. People naturally care more for people close to them (both friends, and people similar to them, and people physically closer to them). To a greater or lesser extent depending on circumstance. This has bad effects, that far away tragedies can get ignored, but good effects, that people can choose to help some people close to them, even if this is a drop in the ocean compared to everything else, but a lot better than just freezing up. But if all possible parallel universes existed, it would make it obvious how every thing you chose to do was an essentially arbitrary decision about how people close to you matter more than everyone else,

Comments

[rysmiel.livejournal.com]

Fair warning; this is a subject on which I can natter nigh-endlessly

* The problem of evil "If God existed, and were omnipotent and good, why would he let there be bad things". If you can even conceive of God not reordering all his universes to be "best", that is one possible answer to the question. (Not that I think that's true, but it's possibly a rebuttal to the argument that "There are bad things, therefore God is at most two of good, omnipotent, and existing")

It just reformulates the problem, though. If there exists a set of all possible parallel universes, why has the postulated value of God chosen for this iteration of me to experience this particular parallel rather than any of the trivially imaginable ones that are better than this one is some straightforward obvious ways ?

* A logical extension of local morality. People naturally care more for people close to them (both friends, and people similar to them, and people physically closer to them). To a greater or lesser extent depending on circumstance.

I have a strong query against that "naturally", and an even stronger against it being a reasonable basis for moral consideration if it happens that it is in our nature.

It seems pretty obvious to me, looking at the general course of human history, that the ability to build a civilisation, with all the advantages of civilisation such as penicillin, the internet, the rule of law and so on, requires an expansion of the range of empathy, of what counts as "us" and what "them"; if you're incapable of grasping that anyone outside your little hunter-gather tribe is also a person, you're never going to be able to build a city. This indicates that this aspect of human nature is mutable and to my mind the logical extension of this is that one maximises potential by regarding the entire species as "us"; nationalism seems to me to be a particularly weird aberration on a scale intemediate between the city and the species, and the sooner we can be rid of it the better.

[redbird]

It seems to me that "naturally care more" doesn't mean "naturally care only about." So it's not just that we define "us" more broadly--to include not just a small family or tribe, but all New Yorkers or Canadians or humans or...--it's that we may be uninterested in people outside the group, but we don't wish them harm, so if they also benefit from the antibiotics and better crops and cell phones, that's cool.

[liv]

You make a very cogent point about morality here. Yes, it's moral to expand the definition of "us" in terms of people of moral worth as much as you possibly can. And not only moral, but it practical because of the large scale organization thing you have such a good grasp of.

But there's another factor apart from moral worth: what Levinas calls responsibility. Sure, it is morally correct to regard people on the other side of the world as people, but you're not responsible for them in the same way you are for your family and friends. Most people wouldn't think much of someone who let his children starve because he was spending all his money on helping victims of humanitarian disasters in the third world, for example.

[robhu.livejournal.com]

Most people wouldn't think much of someone who let his children starve because he was spending all his money on helping victims of humanitarian disasters in the third world, for example.
I agree completely, but I think such people may be wrong. If I allow people to starve in this country but save others from starving in another country I see that as no different from preventing starvation here while not preventing it abroad.

What is it that makes us responsible for family and friends but not people on the other side of the world? Is it because of distance? In todays connected world of banks and aid organisations that isn't a practical issue. Is it because I'm related to my family more so than the person abroad? If so that doesn't explain why I ought to care more about my friends than the person abroad. Perhaps the answer for this cuious behaviour lies in kin selection.

[rysmiel.livejournal.com]

Sure, it is morally correct to regard people on the other side of the world as people, but you're not responsible for them in the same way you are for your family and friends. Most people wouldn't think much of someone who let his children starve because he was spending all his money on helping victims of humanitarian disasters in the third world, for example.

I'll agree that the responsibility there decreases, but that is a function of shared history and commitments; yes, I am less responsible for some random stranger in Calcutta than I am for my immediate family and close friends, but that is by virtue of having built relationships with family and friends and conscously assumed the responsibilities thereof, of a life with a background of choices already made. It would not make it any more morally acceptable, were I to suddenly and strings-free come into possession of half a billion dollars tomorrow, for me to spend the entirety of that on my family and close friends.

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

FWIW, I envisaged it as some sort of scaling factor (except that you could never put a precise number on it), that you could justify doing *more* for people you are close to, but that a great benefit to someone else would outweigh a small benefit to someone you're close to.

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

That's a very good description.

[d37373.livejournal.com]

I can't see that maintaining those requires any expansion of empathy - most of them help my local group. The ones that don't are outweighed by those that do, so it is in my group's interests to maintain the status quo (although attempting to tweak it here and there).

I'd have a harder time arguing about the motivations for the advances themselves, although I'd probably go for something along the lines of delegation of responsibility for decisions to those people who's objectives most align with my own.

Personally, I ascribe my large-scale decisions to an intellectual attempt to improve something large and impersonal (the species, the system, the world) rather than to better the lives of any particular individuals. I can't comprehend that many actual real people, so it can't be empathy. I'm left with 'neatness' and my abstract desire for balanced systems.

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

It just reformulates the problem, though.

Exactly. But I felt some understanding of a "God" who would allow all possible parallel universes to continue (leaving aside for the moment the question of bringing them into existence). And previously I had felt no understanding of any God who would allow a universe like this one. (Also see quote to minipoppy :))

Thus it does reformulate the question, but from a question to which my only response was "It's impossible, there cannot be such a God" to "Hm, maybe those assumptions are not contradictory after all".

Which I thought was sufficiently interesting to ponder. And curious to know if other people would agree. (So far it seems mixed.)

why has the postulated value of God chosen for this iteration of me to experience this particular parallel rather than any of the trivially imaginable ones that are better than this one is some straightforward obvious ways

That is, in the parallel universe case, I felt I might possibly have let them exist. But am still unable to put into words why (or I could just have said that). But felt it likely that other people, presented with the same premise, might feel the same way, and either be able to explain better, or at least see something new into the question.

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

I have a strong query against that "naturally"

I know what you mean. I think I was referencing in passing something I've wibbled about at more length elsewhere. But firstly, people plainly do feel like that, right or wrong.

Definitely expanding "us" as fast as possible is good. Both from a "he has human rights similarly to me" argument, and a "game theory, if we work together we both win" argument.

And something being natural isn't sufficient for it to be good, no: we've decided lots of things we do naturally suck. But I morality must be derived from what we think -- from what else could it be? (I need to rework some old posts that I no longer quite agree with, but things like http://cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com/62407.html)

That is, point #2 in the original post, is based on the idea that it might be ok to place people closer to you with more importance. And a metaphor for why.

Reflecting I see a lot of this is duplicating comments to hilarityallen's post, I'll go down there and look at those comments.