From palmer1984
Oct. 3rd, 2008 02:47 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
My morality posts come along every so often (many archived in cartesiandaemon/tag/society and the abeyed series of posts Things I believe), but I generally find my understanding has shifted when I come back to questions of absolute morality. Thoughts I've proposed:
* The standard I would normally test things against is something like "is this the right thing for me to do in this situation"? I think most people could not define that in any terms more fundamental (no, not even with utilitarianism), but would have an intuitive idea that some things were and were not the right thing to do
* What I think of as my morality is a series of rules of thumb that approximate what I would think is right in a particular situation. (I'm not sure of that, it's something I've thought about. It's similar to what pjc said.)
* Morality is created by intelligent life, we might be able to agree a universal standard (I doubt it), but there's no fundamental property of the universe saying "THIS IS THE PURPOSE" the way there is saying "THIS IS GRAVITY". However, it typically behooves us to decide one and create it! (Obviously, many people would disagree, and say there was an inherent truth. I'd doubt, on the grounds that if it's unmeasurable...)
* Even if we were created by a greater being (effectively God, or God), his PoV isn't necessarily right. I realise this puts me into a philosophically tenuous position -- if I had the power to create the universe, and the aliens in it started doing things I thought were wrong, shouldn't I correct them? But surely, I can only use my moral sense to judge things by. I might be persuaded to trust someone else, but my actions are my responsibility and (to quote) "of course in my judgement! I don't have anyone else's judgement to use".
* Humans are a tribe species. I'm confident a lot of that informs what I feel is right. And I think that's ok -- I don't think things genetically programmed have a magic place in the hierarchy, but nor do I think I have an existence apart from the things that formed me. That's part of me, and I take responsibility for the whole of me.
* WRT subjective morality: obviously lots of details differ in different cultures, and it's not clear if any are better. Often doing what's appropriate is right, but I don't think that really counts as subjective morality.
* WRT subjective morality: obviously you have more luxury to choose in some situations than others. I'm vegetarian, but if I were a hunter/gatherer, I think the survival of me, my relations and my tribe is more important than that of the animals, whether or not I feel sad about it.
* WRT subjective morality: humans are a tribe species. I'm sure some other species doesn't have those imperatives, and would have a very different, or no, idea of morality in they were sapient. This makes me doubt that can be a universal answer. (There could be.)
* And that does mean, often I would disagree with someone else on what's right. And if it's irrelevant, that's ok, but if it's important, one may need to impose one's morality -- eg. we have police, partly in a self-interested measure to enforce cooperation, and partly to impose what we say is right on people who disagree (starting with murder, etc...)
* Of course, sometimes you think something is wrong but are not in a majority, and have to compromise with the other side, rather than try futilely to enforce it, whether you want to or not.
* In terms of what system of morality actually seems to make sense, I always start thinking in terms of utilitarianism. But I think the fundamental flaws are sufficient that won't actually provide a satisfactory framework (and nor will any other system I've heard, however good a start it makes).
* It's true, people's conceptions of what morality is vary wildly over time and geography; I know next to nothing about it, and it's an obvious place to start to consider where we may go next. Modern liberal people like me instinctively think in terms of "harm", but other cultures may think more in terms of "some things are wrong".
* A few things from previous posts. Euthyphro dilemma "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" That is, if there is some sort of constant (if not universal) morality, is God good in that he follows said morality? Or did God design that morality? It may not make any practical difference.
And it's not relevant to every brand of Christianity or religion (one might well come to trust God without having a FAQ of more theoretical questions). However, it was the first question that occurred to me when people started to proselytize me at university. There was a lot more to the question that I didn't understand. But I was very disappointed to see most people didn't even understand the question, let alone have considered it, let alone have a widely-agreed answer. That's not necessary, but it felt like a fairly fundamental plot point to me, and for ages my list of top ten "interesting question to ask prosetylizers" (I am rather contrary, and used to be rather tactless) stopped at that one, as I never got any further... :)
* Hume's Fork. This refers to two different sorts of truth: what is, and what ought to be. The details are difficult to conceive (probably someone else will explain?), but the point is that you can't in general deduce the second from the first. You can see things, and deduce from them how them that if you do this, that will happen, etc. But to decide which things you should cause to happen, you need to make decisions about which are desirable.
Whereas many arguments start from a set of facts, and deduce we "should" do something, implicitly inserting some moral axiom. Which is the axiom is well agreed ("I should do this, else I'll get ill, and suffer") is fine. But if it's questionable ("blah is natural, therefore we should do it") is flawed.
This seemed like an obvious distinction once I'd thought of it (and later discovered Hume's essays on it, which were unsurprisingly much better thought out :)), but I think some people would disagree, and say some moral things can be deduced. Also, I don't think Hume's fork is a complete understanding, merely a good point you should have in your mind on the subject
* Relatedly, often differences in morals come from differences in implementation not just in what's right. If I think the government should do X, and you think Y, it's quite probable that both (a) I place a greater weight on what X is trying to achieve (b) I assume X is of greater relevance than Y, because I have more experience of what X is dealing with, and (c) I think X is more likely to have effective results. One of those is a question of morals, one of fact, and one in-between, but they're all tied[1] up.
That's no exhaustive summary (nor canonical answer), but a few of the things I've thought. (Of course, most have been argued here before, I apologise if I've re-brought-up something you thought was settled :))
[1] Typo: tided up.
* The standard I would normally test things against is something like "is this the right thing for me to do in this situation"? I think most people could not define that in any terms more fundamental (no, not even with utilitarianism), but would have an intuitive idea that some things were and were not the right thing to do
* What I think of as my morality is a series of rules of thumb that approximate what I would think is right in a particular situation. (I'm not sure of that, it's something I've thought about. It's similar to what pjc said.)
* Morality is created by intelligent life, we might be able to agree a universal standard (I doubt it), but there's no fundamental property of the universe saying "THIS IS THE PURPOSE" the way there is saying "THIS IS GRAVITY". However, it typically behooves us to decide one and create it! (Obviously, many people would disagree, and say there was an inherent truth. I'd doubt, on the grounds that if it's unmeasurable...)
* Even if we were created by a greater being (effectively God, or God), his PoV isn't necessarily right. I realise this puts me into a philosophically tenuous position -- if I had the power to create the universe, and the aliens in it started doing things I thought were wrong, shouldn't I correct them? But surely, I can only use my moral sense to judge things by. I might be persuaded to trust someone else, but my actions are my responsibility and (to quote) "of course in my judgement! I don't have anyone else's judgement to use".
* Humans are a tribe species. I'm confident a lot of that informs what I feel is right. And I think that's ok -- I don't think things genetically programmed have a magic place in the hierarchy, but nor do I think I have an existence apart from the things that formed me. That's part of me, and I take responsibility for the whole of me.
* WRT subjective morality: obviously lots of details differ in different cultures, and it's not clear if any are better. Often doing what's appropriate is right, but I don't think that really counts as subjective morality.
* WRT subjective morality: obviously you have more luxury to choose in some situations than others. I'm vegetarian, but if I were a hunter/gatherer, I think the survival of me, my relations and my tribe is more important than that of the animals, whether or not I feel sad about it.
* WRT subjective morality: humans are a tribe species. I'm sure some other species doesn't have those imperatives, and would have a very different, or no, idea of morality in they were sapient. This makes me doubt that can be a universal answer. (There could be.)
* And that does mean, often I would disagree with someone else on what's right. And if it's irrelevant, that's ok, but if it's important, one may need to impose one's morality -- eg. we have police, partly in a self-interested measure to enforce cooperation, and partly to impose what we say is right on people who disagree (starting with murder, etc...)
* Of course, sometimes you think something is wrong but are not in a majority, and have to compromise with the other side, rather than try futilely to enforce it, whether you want to or not.
* In terms of what system of morality actually seems to make sense, I always start thinking in terms of utilitarianism. But I think the fundamental flaws are sufficient that won't actually provide a satisfactory framework (and nor will any other system I've heard, however good a start it makes).
* It's true, people's conceptions of what morality is vary wildly over time and geography; I know next to nothing about it, and it's an obvious place to start to consider where we may go next. Modern liberal people like me instinctively think in terms of "harm", but other cultures may think more in terms of "some things are wrong".
* A few things from previous posts. Euthyphro dilemma "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" That is, if there is some sort of constant (if not universal) morality, is God good in that he follows said morality? Or did God design that morality? It may not make any practical difference.
And it's not relevant to every brand of Christianity or religion (one might well come to trust God without having a FAQ of more theoretical questions). However, it was the first question that occurred to me when people started to proselytize me at university. There was a lot more to the question that I didn't understand. But I was very disappointed to see most people didn't even understand the question, let alone have considered it, let alone have a widely-agreed answer. That's not necessary, but it felt like a fairly fundamental plot point to me, and for ages my list of top ten "interesting question to ask prosetylizers" (I am rather contrary, and used to be rather tactless) stopped at that one, as I never got any further... :)
* Hume's Fork. This refers to two different sorts of truth: what is, and what ought to be. The details are difficult to conceive (probably someone else will explain?), but the point is that you can't in general deduce the second from the first. You can see things, and deduce from them how them that if you do this, that will happen, etc. But to decide which things you should cause to happen, you need to make decisions about which are desirable.
Whereas many arguments start from a set of facts, and deduce we "should" do something, implicitly inserting some moral axiom. Which is the axiom is well agreed ("I should do this, else I'll get ill, and suffer") is fine. But if it's questionable ("blah is natural, therefore we should do it") is flawed.
This seemed like an obvious distinction once I'd thought of it (and later discovered Hume's essays on it, which were unsurprisingly much better thought out :)), but I think some people would disagree, and say some moral things can be deduced. Also, I don't think Hume's fork is a complete understanding, merely a good point you should have in your mind on the subject
* Relatedly, often differences in morals come from differences in implementation not just in what's right. If I think the government should do X, and you think Y, it's quite probable that both (a) I place a greater weight on what X is trying to achieve (b) I assume X is of greater relevance than Y, because I have more experience of what X is dealing with, and (c) I think X is more likely to have effective results. One of those is a question of morals, one of fact, and one in-between, but they're all tied[1] up.
That's no exhaustive summary (nor canonical answer), but a few of the things I've thought. (Of course, most have been argued here before, I apologise if I've re-brought-up something you thought was settled :))
[1] Typo: tided up.
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 02:13 pm (UTC)I was meaning to make a post about objective versus subjective morality myself, but everyone else has beaten me to it :-)
"is this the right thing for me to do in this situation"? I think most people could not define that in any terms more fundamental (no, not even with utilitarianism), but would have an intuitive idea that some things were and were not the right thing to do
What if one person thinks torturing and killing a Jew is morally right, and another thinks it is wrong. Can we say that either are correct? Or can we only say that they have different equally valid opinions?
Obviously, many people would disagree, and say there was an inherent truth. I'd doubt, on the grounds that if it's unmeasurable...
Possibly one route to go is to argue for the inference for the best explanation. If someone does think that the holocaust is wrong even if everyone in the world thought that it was good (say if the Nazis had won and had killed or brainwashed everyone) then they have to explain why it is that they think that. God is one possible explanation (I'd argue the best) for the existence of objective morality.
Even if we were created by a greater being (effectively God, or God), his PoV isn't necessarily right.
I don't know if you saw, but [Bad username or site: andrewducker' / @ livejournal.com] and I discussed this. Christians don't think that good is created by God, rather they consider it to be an essential part of His nature.
obviously lots of details differ in different cultures, and it's not clear if any are better
What does 'better' here mean?
But I think the fundamental flaws are sufficient that won't actually provide a satisfactory framework (and nor will any other system I've heard, however good a start it makes).
Again, I wonder how you determine if someone is 'satisfactory'. You can't mean morally satisfactory I presume because of the problem of determining if a moral system is satisfactory would require a pre-existing moral system with which to compare it.
A few things from previous posts. Euthyphro dilemma "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" That is, if there is some sort of constant (if not universal) morality, is God good in that he follows said morality? Or did God design that morality? It may not make any practical difference.
See here and here.
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 03:14 pm (UTC)Thank you :) I appreciate it.
I was meaning to make a post about objective versus subjective morality myself, but everyone else has beaten me to it :-)
I'm sure there is more to say :)
...is morally right, and another thinks it is wrong. Can we say that either are correct? Or can we only say that they have different equally valid opinions?
Can I pick a different example? But anyway, what I'm getting at there isn't how different people might see it -- that's the subject of the whole post, and I don't pretend my answers are definitive -- but rather that right-and-wrong are things that govern choices-of-actions, heading of any more metaphysical definitions that don't affect anything we can perceive. (I don't know if that would have come up, but it seemed a good place to start from.)
God is one possible explanation (I'd argue the best) for the existence of objective morality.
Agreed :) (Obviously, I'm currently believing in neither, but certianly god would have a lot to do with objective morality, and vice-versa, and share some of the same arguments for each.)
Possibly one route to go is to argue for the inference for the best explanation.
How do you mean? (I know I'm wading into murky waters with abandoning an objective morality; cf. a universe where everyone thinks something different than what I think is right. Though I still feel it's the right way to start...)
What does 'better' here mean?
I should have used more examples. What I mean is that in England it might be rude to say X, but in Australia, it might be perfectly normal. And by (most) standards of morality, it's better to avoid being rude without justification, even though this involves saying different things in different countries. And some examples may have a moral difference but some don't (in any/most moralities) and this is consistent with both subjective and objective morality.
Again, I wonder how you determine if someone is 'satisfactory'.
Well, I think most moral frameworks I've seen proposed I've thought were encapsulating something important (eg. utilitarianism is all about minimising harm/maximising good experiences, which I think is an important insight, whether or not it's ultimately right). But all of them have on closer inspection (a) inconsistencies and (b) advocated actions I disagree with.
Maybe that's too strong, but that's the impression I get.
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 03:50 pm (UTC)I believe there is no objective morality, but I wouldn't say that the two had equally valid opinions. I would simply say that the two had opinions.
I think that the word "valid", applied to something like an opinion, is essentially meaningless. Applied to a proof or logical argument, it has a well defined meaning in terms of whether the argument conforms to the pre-agreed rules for such arguments; but there are no pre-agreed rules for opinions, since the only qualification for something to be called an opinion is that it should exist in someone's head and they should honestly believe it. (Indeed, the sort of internal inconsistency that would disqualify a logical argument from validity certainly does not seem to stop people from holding all sorts of opinions!)
But the word "valid", when used of an opinion, somehow seems to carry a connotation of, well, if not approval then at least admission of the opinion to some sort of club of basically "accepted" opinions. So I would argue that statements like your proposed one – taking an opinion widely considered atrocious and its opposite, and declaring that a moral relativist would consider the two "equally valid" – have the effect of insidious anti-relativist spin: they're suggesting by their choice of words that the moral relativist might consider both opinions acceptable in some sense, perhaps even equally so, without ever quite saying it in terms that can't be plausibly denied when the statement is challenged. But a relativist need not consider your Godwin-tempting pair of example opinions to be equally acceptable in any actually meaningful sense, beyond acknowledging that both of them are actual opinions actually held by people: I would certainly not accept the first, in the sense that if I heard it proposed I would argue against it in an attempt to persuade its holder out of it, or failing that to at least discourage them from acting on it and/or dissuade anyone else from being swayed by their claim.
If I were put in a philosophy classroom (or an equivalent LJ debate) and asked to comment on the two viewpoints, I would not be able to say that either was correct in any sense which I could defend with an unimpeachable argument from first principles. I would have to say that they are simply opinions: not "valid" or "invalid", just ideas in people's heads which affect their behaviour, and which may or may not agree with ideas on related subjects in other people's heads.
Anywhere else in the world, I most certainly can say that the second person was correct, which in this context is widely understood to mean the same thing as "it agrees with my own opinion on the matter". I can also apply social pressure to encourage my friends to hold similar opinions (or at least to keep them quiet if they didn't); I can vote for people who support criminal justice measures which help to deter people with the opposite opinion from putting it into practice; if I had children I could bring them up to share my opinions. All of these things are more useful in the cause of actually stopping people from doing it than a proof from first principles in a philosophy classroom would be even if one existed, so it doesn't seem vitally important to me that one doesn't.
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 04:03 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 04:30 pm (UTC)Thank you. I saw that in passing, now I've read it in slightly more detail.
* By the way, possibly apologies for being facetious about the ontological argument :) I was intending to joke about the extremely convoluted debate the ontological argument always brings, not reject the post (I'll get onto that in a sec, but not flippantly :))
* FWIW I don't find the Euthyphro dilemma necessarily a dilemma, since most possible answers seem like they could be consistent with Christian theology as I understand it, and what I would be prepared to belief if I believed in God. I do think it's an important question if you're considering morality in the context of God, though.
* I completely disagree with those links though, since they both seem based on the ontological argument, which I think is utterly flawed[1].
* You may be right, but I doubt you can say with certainty what all Christians think on a question this hypothetical... I just know different people will have different interpretations, and many will simply never have considered it.
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 04:39 pm (UTC)(i) If the proof is valid, the same proof is valid if God is possible (this is afaik the standard ontological argument), and if in your definition of great you replace "moral good" with "volume contained in space filled with custard". From which you could deduce a God necessarily existing in every universe, whose volume contained in space filled with custard is maximal, ie. all of it. There is no custard in this room. Contradiction.
(ii) As previously mentioned, I disagree with the bit that deduces God necessarily exists. I don't think it's well formed.
(iii) Even if you assume there is an objective morality, there may still be flaws with assuming there's a unique, maximum set of morals.
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 04:40 pm (UTC)- By definition God, if He existed, would be perfect.
- One of the properties of perfection is existence.
- Therefore God, if He existed, would exist.
:-)no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 04:56 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 06:48 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 11:14 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 07:01 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 11:19 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2008-10-04 01:28 am (UTC)*hug*
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 06:04 pm (UTC)Ordinary people like you or me would usually think that killing lots of people is an immoral act, and that ordering the killing of lots of people is also immoral. But in the Bible God does both. In fact, he seems to be strongly in favour of genocide.
There are lots of examples, but here are a couple from 1 Samuel:
1 Samuel 6:19 "But God struck down some of the men of Beth Shemesh, putting 50070 of them to death because they had looked into the ark of the LORD. The people mourned because of the heavy blow the LORD had dealt them"
(note - a few manuscripts have 70 instead of 50070.)
1 Samuel 15:3 [God said] "Now go, attack the Amalekites and totally destroy everything that belongs to them. Do not spare them; put to death men and women, children and infants, cattle and sheep, camels and donkeys."
Thomas Paine, in 'The Age of Reason', said "Whenever we read the obscene stories, the voluptuous debaucheries, the cruel and tortuous executions, the unrelenting vindictiveness with which more than half the Bible is filled, it would be more consistant that we call it the word of a demon than the word of God. It is a history of wickedness that has served to corrupt and brutalize mankind; and, for my part, I sincerely detest it, as I detest everything that is cruel."
I think he has a point.
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 06:52 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 11:18 pm (UTC):)
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 06:58 pm (UTC)If someone does think that the holocaust is wrong even if everyone in the world thought that it was good (say if the Nazis had won and had killed or brainwashed everyone) then they have to explain why it is that they think that. God is one possible explanation (I'd argue the best) for the existence of objective morality.
Oh, I disagree entirely.
The objective measure that comes to mind here is survival potential. Selection pressure applies, regardless of what we do about it.
The problem with Darwin applying is that selective pressures are short-term. They respond to what works best in the moment, and if that leads to a local minimum, you are stuffed.
Therefore, as sentient beings, the best way we can outperform the behaviour of short-term selective pressures is to deliberately maintain variety and complexity, as insurance against a short-term good turning out to be a long-term loss.
Therefore, in a survival-based morality, genocide is bad because it is reducing the available space of cultural variety and complexity.
Again, I wonder how you determine if someone is 'satisfactory'. You can't mean morally satisfactory I presume because of the problem of determining if a moral system is satisfactory would require a pre-existing moral system with which to compare it.
Not necessarily. You can judge its success in terms of survival, or in terms of maximising human happiness, just to take two examples. (I'm not inclined to see them as separable, really.)
no subject
Date: 2008-10-03 11:22 pm (UTC)Still, I'd be interested in more of the list.
no subject
Date: 2008-10-04 12:07 am (UTC)I admit, there was a lot more to most of the questions that would have been on the list than I would have known anything about at the time. Most would have been long-debated by scholars before I ever thought of them. But it seemed like anywhere you looked there were open questions that I felt ought to be fairly well agreed upon by anyone in the same religion, but didn't seem to be available in a five-minute FAQ when you joined up. Off the top of my head, obvious examples might have included:
* Why do bad things happen?
* Do miracles happen?
* Did Jesus know he was the son of God when he was alive?
* So, why does the bible contradict itself at [several examples]
* Do bad people go to hell? What is hell? How about non-believers? How about people who died BC?
* How much of this stuff is actually in the bible, and how much is just "obvious"?
* How do you know any of this stuff is true?
Note, now I know rather more about what good answers would be, so no-one feel obliged to start telling me (though feel free to discuss it if you want ;)). Indeed, nowadays I might meet someone well-meaning and devout who wanted to convert me, and find myself having to fill in both sides of the argument :)