Akrasia and Morality
Aug. 9th, 2012 10:19 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
jackAkrasia
Is there a difference between "what I do" and "what I want to do"?
In fact, it looks a bit like a paradox. There's a very real way where want someone acts on is a better meaning for "what they want" than what they SAY they want. But also, we're all familiar with wanting to break a habit, and yet apparently being unable to do so.
There is a greek word, "Akrasia" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akrasia) meaning "to act against your own best interests", where "best interests" is a bit subjective but we get the general idea. The concept has been adopted by many rationalist devotes/self improvers (http://lesswrong.com/lw/h7/selfdeception_hypocrisy_or_akrasia/).
The idea is, there IS a difference between what we want immediately, and what we want longer term. It may be unfair to call long-term wants what we "really" want, and there's still a difference between "what we want" and "what would be most likely to make us happy if we got it", but they can be as valid wants as immediate wants are.
For instance, someone who really wants a cigarette, but really wants to give up smoking, may be in the position of choosing between immediate and longer-term wants.
When we took about someone having will-power, or someone being logical, what we really mean is someone who can weigh their immediate and long-term wants objectively, without automatically following emotions/instincts. (When we talk about someone who is OVER logical, we often mean someone who discounts their immediate pleasure too much.)
Is that an apt description of the difference?
Morality
Is there a difference between "a moral action" and "an action I want someone to do", without an objective standard of morality? I know people are prone to see a difference even when it isn't there, which makes me suspicious of anything I might suggest, but it's sensible to think about any proposals and not dismiss them out of hand. It may not be something other than what I want, but might it be a different type of what I want?
If we have a distinction between "wants for now-me" and "wants for future-me" I wonder if we could draw a similar distinction between "wants for me" and "wants for everyone else".
That is, is there a recognisable difference between "what I would enjoy" and "what I would like because it would make someone I like happy" and "what I feel I should do because someone would do it for me" and "what I should do for someone else because it's the right thing, even if no-one else thinks so", even if you can only infer what's going on in someone else's head?
I think there is, that people recognise a difference between "what they should do" and "what they'd like to do", and what they DO do is governed at a particular moment by where they currently fall on a scale between thinking "of course I'll do what I should do" and thinking "I'm overdue for something just for me". However, I'm not sure if I can actually test that or if it's just speculation.
With little indescretions, I think people do see a difference between "I know it's against the law, but I think it's ok" and "I know I shouldn't do this if I had infinite amounts of time and money to fix every world problem however small, but in the real world, there's no realistic way to avoid doing X". And I'm inclined to think that even people who do bigger bad things are probably thinking in the same way: "well, yeah, ideally I wouldn't've killed him/her, but you know, what can you do?" And morality for a person is something like "those things they think they would do in a magically perfect world where they could", somehow combined with what they prioritise when they put it into practice. But I don't know if that point of view is actually valid for other people or not.
Is there a difference between "what I do" and "what I want to do"?
In fact, it looks a bit like a paradox. There's a very real way where want someone acts on is a better meaning for "what they want" than what they SAY they want. But also, we're all familiar with wanting to break a habit, and yet apparently being unable to do so.
There is a greek word, "Akrasia" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akrasia) meaning "to act against your own best interests", where "best interests" is a bit subjective but we get the general idea. The concept has been adopted by many rationalist devotes/self improvers (http://lesswrong.com/lw/h7/selfdeception_hypocrisy_or_akrasia/).
The idea is, there IS a difference between what we want immediately, and what we want longer term. It may be unfair to call long-term wants what we "really" want, and there's still a difference between "what we want" and "what would be most likely to make us happy if we got it", but they can be as valid wants as immediate wants are.
For instance, someone who really wants a cigarette, but really wants to give up smoking, may be in the position of choosing between immediate and longer-term wants.
When we took about someone having will-power, or someone being logical, what we really mean is someone who can weigh their immediate and long-term wants objectively, without automatically following emotions/instincts. (When we talk about someone who is OVER logical, we often mean someone who discounts their immediate pleasure too much.)
Is that an apt description of the difference?
Morality
Is there a difference between "a moral action" and "an action I want someone to do", without an objective standard of morality? I know people are prone to see a difference even when it isn't there, which makes me suspicious of anything I might suggest, but it's sensible to think about any proposals and not dismiss them out of hand. It may not be something other than what I want, but might it be a different type of what I want?
If we have a distinction between "wants for now-me" and "wants for future-me" I wonder if we could draw a similar distinction between "wants for me" and "wants for everyone else".
That is, is there a recognisable difference between "what I would enjoy" and "what I would like because it would make someone I like happy" and "what I feel I should do because someone would do it for me" and "what I should do for someone else because it's the right thing, even if no-one else thinks so", even if you can only infer what's going on in someone else's head?
I think there is, that people recognise a difference between "what they should do" and "what they'd like to do", and what they DO do is governed at a particular moment by where they currently fall on a scale between thinking "of course I'll do what I should do" and thinking "I'm overdue for something just for me". However, I'm not sure if I can actually test that or if it's just speculation.
With little indescretions, I think people do see a difference between "I know it's against the law, but I think it's ok" and "I know I shouldn't do this if I had infinite amounts of time and money to fix every world problem however small, but in the real world, there's no realistic way to avoid doing X". And I'm inclined to think that even people who do bigger bad things are probably thinking in the same way: "well, yeah, ideally I wouldn't've killed him/her, but you know, what can you do?" And morality for a person is something like "those things they think they would do in a magically perfect world where they could", somehow combined with what they prioritise when they put it into practice. But I don't know if that point of view is actually valid for other people or not.
no subject
Date: 2012-08-09 11:28 am (UTC)Developing this theme, I think that there certainly *can* be a difference between wants for now-me and wants for future-me, but that with deliberate intent these two can converge more and more, and furthermore that this convergence is desirable because it minimises the waste of energy spent being conflicted.
For example, suppose I have a work email I don't want to send, not so urgent that I couldn't put it off for a couple of days, but really something I know I ought to get on with.
I don't want to write/send it, but simultaneously, I (both now-me and future-me) want to be the sort of person who gets on with things and bloody well does it and gets it over with. I (now-me) will then do a quick check of anything else that's relevant(e.g. am I in a reasonable frame of mind to send it? if I have just had a massive row with someone, I should probably avoid it in case that leaks through) but assuming that passes I will get on with it.
This makes now-me simultaneously unhappy (because it's unpleasant) and happy (because I am showing that I am being the sort of person I want to be), and makes future-me doubly happy (because it's over and done, and I have been the sort of person I want to be). This is much better than putting it off which makes now-me a little unhappy (because I'm not doing it, which is neutral as it's not actively pleasant, and I'm not being the sort of person I want to be which makes me unhappy) and leaves future-me in the position of still having to deal with it later.
So I guess my argument is that although in some sense there's a difference between one's immediate wants/instincts/emotions and one's future wants, these can be brought to alignment through beliefs about identity and self? Or something along those lines ... after all, future-me must bear some resemblance to now-me, or they wouldn't both be me.
no subject
Date: 2012-08-09 03:41 pm (UTC)I have another post brewing about how much "what we have an urge to do" corresponds to "what will make us happy if we do". For, say, bacteria, it's obvious that's a rough approximation. But our brains are so good at it, we start to take it for granted and assume it MUST be the case, when actually, it's only a constant (but effective) balancing act.
And that can go wrong with something like addicition, when something has a nearly 100% urge to do, but has no benefit, or the only benefit is a temporary postponing of the addiction.
I think harmonising "what we have an urge to do" and "what will make us short term happy" and "what will make us long term happy" is not automatic, but is something we aspire towards.