Doing the right thing
Feb. 27th, 2006 03:21 pmDo you draw a distinction between doing the right thing because you want to and because you feel you ought to?
You might give a coworker a lift to their home, somewhat out of your way[1] because:
(a) You're happy to spend that time with them
(b) You want them to get home easily
(c) You feel you should, and want to because someone else may have to help you similarly, but actually think "agh, why today?"
[1] Purely hypothetical example.
In some sense they are the same, because your total satisfaction in doing it must be positive, or you wouldn't be doing it. But motivation feels like it matters.
Can you even define the difference? For instance, would you just make the problem go away if you could? Yes, in case (c). But why not in (a) and (b) -- you'd want to help, wouldn't you? Or assume your ethics seek to maximise happiness. Do (a) and (b) increase happiness in you both, and (c) in her only?[2]
[2] Where happiness is defined as genuine happiness, and your satisfaction at making happiness in others (possibly because you want them to behave similarly from similar logic, or out of gratitude, or just because you maximise hapiness) doesn't count, but is some sort of second order happiness.
And, habit will eventually convert you into a or b more often.
What fictional characters define this? Deep Wizardry (Diane Duane) makes a point of a truly willing sacrifice working better than someone who feels they ought to. But doesn't define it for us.
Carrot Ironfounderson probably genuinely enjoys helping people. Vimes I think is more I have to do this or I'm as bad as he is. Carrot seems a whole lot more happy about it. But is someone like that a better person? Does that question have meaning?
You might give a coworker a lift to their home, somewhat out of your way[1] because:
(a) You're happy to spend that time with them
(b) You want them to get home easily
(c) You feel you should, and want to because someone else may have to help you similarly, but actually think "agh, why today?"
[1] Purely hypothetical example.
In some sense they are the same, because your total satisfaction in doing it must be positive, or you wouldn't be doing it. But motivation feels like it matters.
Can you even define the difference? For instance, would you just make the problem go away if you could? Yes, in case (c). But why not in (a) and (b) -- you'd want to help, wouldn't you? Or assume your ethics seek to maximise happiness. Do (a) and (b) increase happiness in you both, and (c) in her only?[2]
[2] Where happiness is defined as genuine happiness, and your satisfaction at making happiness in others (possibly because you want them to behave similarly from similar logic, or out of gratitude, or just because you maximise hapiness) doesn't count, but is some sort of second order happiness.
And, habit will eventually convert you into a or b more often.
What fictional characters define this? Deep Wizardry (Diane Duane) makes a point of a truly willing sacrifice working better than someone who feels they ought to. But doesn't define it for us.
Carrot Ironfounderson probably genuinely enjoys helping people. Vimes I think is more I have to do this or I'm as bad as he is. Carrot seems a whole lot more happy about it. But is someone like that a better person? Does that question have meaning?
no subject
Date: 2006-02-27 03:49 pm (UTC)You're totally a Kantian when it comes to ethics, I reckon. (According to him, an action can only be judged to be moral if it's done because of duty--i.e. it's the right thing to do--rather than because it will make you happy. Of course, it's a bonus if it makes you happy as well, but you'd have to do the action even if it would make you unhappy for it to be moral, rather than just nice.)
no subject
Date: 2006-02-27 04:00 pm (UTC)I haven't been able to be convinced by kant's approach as sumarised there (though I haven't read how Kant described it), for that reason; which sorts of happiness count? If I enjoy it, is that happiness rather than duty? If I enjoy helping someone (A), is that? If I genuinely enjoy helping people in all ways, does that mean I'm incapable of moral actions? That seems backwards!
If I help someone on the grounds that "this is the course of action which if everyone pursues will work" (B), I can accept that's sense more than morals. But doing so accords closely with what people think of as moral, because it's basically "being a good society member".
In fact, it becomes hard to do *anything* *mainly* because I feel I should, without coming under (A) or (B), and it mainly makes me feel bad, so (likely) I don't understand Kant well enough or (likely) his theory is incomplete.