Doing the right thing

[jack]

Do you draw a distinction between doing the right thing because you want to and because you feel you ought to?

You might give a coworker a lift to their home, somewhat out of your way[1] because:

(a) You're happy to spend that time with them
(b) You want them to get home easily
(c) You feel you should, and want to because someone else may have to help you similarly, but actually think "agh, why today?"

[1] Purely hypothetical example.

In some sense they are the same, because your total satisfaction in doing it must be positive, or you wouldn't be doing it. But motivation feels like it matters.

Can you even define the difference? For instance, would you just make the problem go away if you could? Yes, in case (c). But why not in (a) and (b) -- you'd want to help, wouldn't you? Or assume your ethics seek to maximise happiness. Do (a) and (b) increase happiness in you both, and (c) in her only?[2]

[2] Where happiness is defined as genuine happiness, and your satisfaction at making happiness in others (possibly because you want them to behave similarly from similar logic, or out of gratitude, or just because you maximise hapiness) doesn't count, but is some sort of second order happiness.

And, habit will eventually convert you into a or b more often.

What fictional characters define this? Deep Wizardry (Diane Duane) makes a point of a truly willing sacrifice working better than someone who feels they ought to. But doesn't define it for us.

Carrot Ironfounderson probably genuinely enjoys helping people. Vimes I think is more I have to do this or I'm as bad as he is. Carrot seems a whole lot more happy about it. But is someone like that a better person? Does that question have meaning?

Comments

[senji.livejournal.com]

No, I think in (c) your total satisfaction might be negative, but you're doing it as part of a kind of galactic karma bank that you'll be able to use to reduce the negativeness of future satisfaction deficits.

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

Could you say that again? Do you mean the "Someday someone will do something like that for me, or rather I shall behave how I want everyone to behave" thing?

I assume the total happiness produced should be positive, or we'll end up just trading favours back and forth into bigger and bigger inconveniences.

[atreic.livejournal.com]

Note that senji is saying your happiness, and you are saying total happiness. No contradiction

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

Ah, thank you. Then, c is almost exactly when your happiness is negative, I think. Counting karma-returning when it appears rather than when you earn it.

[miss-next.livejournal.com]

I used to have this problem with my mother. I used to do a lot of voluntary work in my late teens, and she told me I was the most selfish person she knew. Once I'd got over the shock enough to ask her what she meant, it turned out that she didn't think it counted as doing any good because I enjoyed it. As far as she was concerned, if you weren't doing something purely out of a sense of duty, then you were being selfish.

I am happy to relate that she has seen sense since. :-)

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

I think it's a matter of parallel motivations. I can do something *both* because I enjoy it and because it helps someone. If I do exactly what I want, and it happens to be useful but I don't care about that, I don't think I get moral credit. If people want to help, it's ridiculous to place them where they're *least* efficient/happy.

It used to paralyse me, when thinking about doing something nice was swamped by "am I only doing this because I want to seem like a nice person", but of course, it's still better by any standard to do it than not.

[miss-next.livejournal.com]

Well, the thing is, I like helping people. I always have done. I get a great deal of pleasure from seeing other people being happy.

The thing is, if you don't actually like helping people but you do it out of a sense of duty, it'll register with them on some level, and they are going to feel uncomfortable, so in a sense everyone loses. If you do like helping people, they will pick up on that too and be happy that you are enjoying helping them, so everyone wins.

No contest!

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

Yeah. See Kantian response below.

But you say that as if you have a choice as to if you enjoy helping people or not. Obviously you're right: it's better if you do. But *deciding* to is trickier, if you can't enjoy it, it's still better to help than not...

[miss-next.livejournal.com]

*nods*

I'm aware that I don't have a choice, but I suppose what triggered the phrasing of that comment was Mum's attitude; she acted as though I did have a choice. And, I agree, if you can't enjoy it, it is better to help than not... and to try to avoid making it obvious that you don't enjoy it! :-)

[wednesdayschild.livejournal.com]

Do you draw a distinction between doing the right thing because you want to and because you feel you ought to? [...] In some sense they are the same, because your total satisfaction in doing it must be positive, or you wouldn't be doing it. But motivation feels like it matters.

You're totally a Kantian when it comes to ethics, I reckon. (According to him, an action can only be judged to be moral if it's done because of duty--i.e. it's the right thing to do--rather than because it will make you happy. Of course, it's a bonus if it makes you happy as well, but you'd have to do the action even if it would make you unhappy for it to be moral, rather than just nice.)

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

I didn't think I definitively came down on either side; I'm genuinely not sure if my answer to all those "if" questions is yes or no. The kantian idea is something I was reacting against -- see the response to miss_next.

I haven't been able to be convinced by kant's approach as sumarised there (though I haven't read how Kant described it), for that reason; which sorts of happiness count? If I enjoy it, is that happiness rather than duty? If I enjoy helping someone (A), is that? If I genuinely enjoy helping people in all ways, does that mean I'm incapable of moral actions? That seems backwards!

If I help someone on the grounds that "this is the course of action which if everyone pursues will work" (B), I can accept that's sense more than morals. But doing so accords closely with what people think of as moral, because it's basically "being a good society member".

In fact, it becomes hard to do *anything* *mainly* because I feel I should, without coming under (A) or (B), and it mainly makes me feel bad, so (likely) I don't understand Kant well enough or (likely) his theory is incomplete.

[feanelwa.livejournal.com]

I think some people just do the right thing out of habit.

On the other hand I saw in the street the other day a father with three little children, and he was being utterly horrible to them, shouting in their faces and hitting them, and they all looked pale and small and like they were about to cry but had learned a long time ago that it never helped. On my way home I realised the right thing for me to do would have been to push him in front of a bus, because it would minimise the ruining of three lives (possibly four, if their mother was being treated like that too, and from the behaviour of the man I had a feeling she was) at the price of ruining one, because I would spend a long time in prison. If I'd pushed him under a bus I would have given the world a net increase in good, so I really should have done it. It bothers me that I was too selfish to do it, and didn't think of it at the time anyway.

[vyvyan.livejournal.com]

Do you draw a distinction between doing the right thing because you want to and because you feel you ought to?

No, because I don't even distinguish between something being the right thing to do and being what I feel happiest doing, as discussed in comments to your previous morality post. Also, I can imagine that I might feel (a) and/or (b), but still think "agh, why today?" - and then give them a lift anyway!

This question puts me in mind of Dawkins' definitions of selfishness and altruism for his purposes in The Selfish Gene: "An entity [...] is said to be altruistic if it behaves in such a way as to increase another entity's welfare at the expense of its own. Selfish behaviour has exactly the opposite effect. 'Welfare' is defined as 'chances of survival', even if the effect on actual life and death is so small as to seem negligible. [...T]he above definitions of altruism and selfishness are behavioural, not subjective. I am not concerned here with the psychology of motives. I am not going to argue about whether people who behave altruistically are 'really' doing it for secret or subconscious selfish motives. Maybe they are and maybe they aren't, and maybe we can never know [...] My definition is concerned only with whether the effect of an act is to lower or raise the survival prospects of the presumed altruist and the survival prospects of the presumed beneficiary."

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

Yes. I should be more careful to reword my questions so they can be answered, removing ambiguity. Maybe behaviourally say not "is this right" but "would you choose to do this..." or "would you recommend I do this"

Dawkin's phrases sound useful. I guess in all three I would be altruistic, as you're giving up your free time (with a minor chance of finding a mate) for someone else's. And if I have a "be altruistic to altrusitic people" gene, it's (probably) being selfish.

In which case where is the distinction between (b) and (c). I guess the community within which the mutual-altruisity (prisoner's dilemma cooperator) operates. A "selfish" person to themselves, case (a) -- though it's being fooled by some other misapplied gene, because chatting to people I like is pretty unrelated from breeding. Then within family. Then extended to "people I like" (b) and "people" (c), which is the gene being accidently altruistic?

[yrieithydd.livejournal.com]

1] Purely hypothetical example.

Why is it when someone emphasises that something is a purely hypothetical example do I immediately wonder when the incident happened?

Vimes I think is more I have to do this or I'm as bad as he is. Carrot seems a whole lot more happy about it. But is someone like that a better person? Does that question have meaning?

I think I'd argue Vimes was the better person because he's doing it from a disadvantaged position. I am reminded of a chapter of C.S. Lewis' Mere Christianity entitled Nice people or new men? where he attacks the idea that because not all Christians are nice Christianity can't be true. He points out that you don't know how bad that individual would be if they weren't a Christian.

[cartesiandaemon.livejournal.com]

Why is it when someone emphasises that something is a purely hypothetical example do I immediately wonder when the incident happened?

LOL. But no, for once, I meant exactly what I said. If I was referring to a specific incident I would have obscured it better or fessed up; too often people appealing to messageboards for validation of their gripes provide no context and the question becomes meaningless.

I think I'd argue Vimes was the better person because he's doing it from a disadvantaged position.

Hmmm. True, he seems to have put in more effort to do the right thing. But then this is the same fallacy the other way round: people who always pick up litter are going to be pissed off if we make too much of people who only do it occasionally, if we can't know if the first people found it just as difficult but overcame it.

I am reminded of a chapter of C.S. Lewis' Mere Christianity entitled Nice people or new men? where he attacks the idea that because not all Christians are nice Christianity can't be true. He points out that you don't know how bad that individual would be if they weren't a Christian.

Hmm. Yeah. Of course, that could be used to justify anything; individual datums aren't answering it ;(